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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Robert Wesley Warden appeals from the summary dismissal of his amended petition for
post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Following a bench trial, Warden was convicted of felony driving under the influence of
alcohol. (R., p. 179.) On direct appeal, he challenged only his sentence, which was affirmed in
an unpublished opinion from the Court of Appeals. State v. Warden, No. 46136, 2019 WL
1581659 (Idaho Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2019). He filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief (R.,
pp. 7-11), as well as a motion for appointment of counsel (R., pp. 12-18), which motion the
district court granted

(R, p. 19).

Appointed counsel filed an amended petition for post-

conviction relief supported by affidavits from counsel and a law student who was “assisting him
in gathering information.” (R., pp. 61-97.)
The amended petition alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to draw
attention to alleged inconsistencies between various statements from the officer, Deputy
AuGello, who initiated the traffic stop leading to Warden’s arrest. (R., pp. 64-68.) In particular,
he claimed that Deputy AuGello was inconsistent between his probable cause affidavit, various
hearings, and at trial regarding precisely where on a particular road he first encountered Warden
and initiated a traffic stop. (R, pp. 64-66.) He additionally alleged that Deputy AuGello’s claim
that he initially started following Warden after he and Warden passed one another and he
observed Warden cross the fog-line in his driver’s side mirror was implausible. (R., pp. 67-68.)
He sought to support the claim that Deputy AuGello’s statement was implausible with statements
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in counsel’s affidavit and the affidavit of his assistant regarding the curve of the road and how
dark it would allegedly have been that night. (R., pp. 86-94.)
The state answered and moved for summary dismissal. (R., pp. 102-10, 119-28.)
Based on a stipulation by the parties, the district court took judicial notice of seven
exhibits: (A) Deputy AuGello’s probable cause affidavit; (B) the transcript of the preliminary
hearing from the underlying case; (C) the transcript of a civil “BAC Hearing” for the suspension
of Warden’s license under I.C. § 18-8002 after he refused evidentiary testing for drugs and
alcohol; (D) the transcript of a preliminary hearing for a separate but related criminal
case―Idaho County Case No. CR-2017-2562―in which Warden was charged with aggravated
battery after he urinated on Deputy AuGello from the back of the patrol car following his arrest;
(E) the transcript of a hearing on a motion to suppress filed in both criminal cases; (F) an order
denying a motion for a new trial in the underlying criminal case; and, (G) one page from the
report of the presentence investigation following Warden’s conviction. (R., pp. 177-78.)
Following a hearing, the district court summarily dismissed Warden’s petition. (R., pp.
179-85.) The court held that the alleged inconsistencies in Deputy AuGello’s statements during
various hearings concerned immaterial details that did not bear in any way on whether the traffic
stop of Warden was constitutionally permissible, there was no evidence that counsel’s
performance was deficient, and no evidence that Warden was in any way prejudiced. (Id.) The
district court entered judgment dismissing the petition (R., p. 207) and Warden timely appealed
(R., pp. 191-94).
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ISSUE
Warden states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Warden’s claim that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to challenge
whether the stop of his vehicle was supported by reasonable suspicion?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Warden failed to show that the district court erred by denying his amended petition
for post-conviction relief because his trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress based on
alleged inconsistencies in the officer’s statements regarding events preceding the stop of his
vehicle?
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ARGUMENT
Warden Has Not Shown That The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing His Amended
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction
On appeal, Warden argues that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his

amended petition for post-conviction relief because “he received ineffective assistance of counsel
when his attorney failed to challenge, in a motion to suppress, whether Deputy Aguello [sic] had
reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Warden’s vehicle.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) That argument
fails for several reasons, but primarily because, as the district court found, the alleged
inconsistencies in Deputy AuGello’s testimony that allegedly provide the grounds for the motion
to suppress that Warden claims should have been filed have nothing at all to do with whether
Deputy AuGello had reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a stop. A motion to suppress on
the grounds set out in Warden’s petition would certainly have been denied.

B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary

hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists based on the
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file.” Workman v. State,
144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007).

C.

Warden Has Not Shown That The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing His
Claim Of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure

Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent
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civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled to
relief. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802.
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for postconviction relief, in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own initiative, if the applicant
“has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims
upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.” Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960
P.2d 738, 739 (1998). Until controverted by the state, allegations in a verified post-conviction
application are, for purposes of determining whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, deemed true.
Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). However, the court is not
required to accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible
evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d
110, 112 (2001); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).
Because the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact in the event of an evidentiary
hearing, summary disposition is permissible, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences to
be drawn from the facts, for the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between
those inferences. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444, 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008). That is, the
judge in a post-conviction action is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party
opposing the motion for summary disposition but rather is free to arrive at the most probable
inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Id.
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-conviction petitioner
must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307
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(1989). With respect to the deficient performance prong, the United States Supreme Court has
articulated the defendant’s burden under Strickland as follows:
To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a conviction must show
that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance must apply a strong
presumption that counsel’s representation was within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. The challenger’s burden is to show that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011) (citations and quotations omitted).
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.
Richter, 562 U.S. at 104. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). “It is not enough to show
that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. Rather,
“[c]ounsel’s errors must be so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable.” Id.
When a post-conviction petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
motion, “the district court may consider the probability of success of the motion in question in
determining whether the attorney’s inactivity constituted incompetent performance.” Wolf v.
State, 152 Idaho 64, 67, 266 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Boman v. State, 129 Idaho
520, 526, 927 P.2d 910, 916 (Ct. App.1996)). “Where the alleged deficiency is counsel’s failure
to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by the
trial court, is generally determinative of both prongs of the Strickland test.” Id. at 67-68, 266
P.3d at 1172-73.
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As an initial matter, Warden’s argument on appeal should be rejected because he failed to
provide an adequate record to support his petition. Warden does not claim that counsel in the
underlying case was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress. He cannot argue as much
because a motion to suppress was in fact filed by counsel in the underlying case. (See Ex. E
(Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Suppress).) Instead, he argues that counsel was ineffective
for failing to argue in the motion to suppress that the initial traffic stop was unlawful. But the
motion to suppress was not submitted to the district court in support of the petition, postconviction counsel did not ask the district court to take judicial notice of it, and it is not in the
record on appeal.

Indeed, it appears that there was briefing―or at least briefing was

contemplated―with respect to whether there was reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a
traffic stop. (Ex. C, p. 80, L. 19 – p. 81, L. 10 (Warden asking for additional time to research and
brief whether there was “legal cause to stop” him).) That briefing is not in the record on appeal
and was not submitted below. Neither the district court nor this Court can conclude that Warden
has stated a prima facie claim for ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to
make a particular argument in a motion to suppress when the motion to suppress that was filed is
not in the record. It is the post-conviction petitioner’s obligation to ensure that the appropriate
documents from the underlying criminal case are in front of the post-conviction court, Fortin v.
State, 160 Idaho 437, 444, 374 P.3d 600, 607 (Ct. App. 2016), and it is the appellant’s burden to
provide an adequate record on appeal, Wilson v. State, 133 Idaho 874, 878, 993 P.2d 1205, 1209
(Ct. App. 2000).
In addition, as the district court in the post-conviction proceedings found, Warden’s
amended petition provides absolutely no reason to think there was a meritorious motion to
suppress to be made based on the theory that the traffic stop was unlawful. (R., pp. 179-85.)
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Warden’s amended petition focuses entirely on alleged inconsistences in Deputy AuGello’s
statements during proceedings in this and other, related cases regarding where he initially
encountered Warden’s vehicle, as well as a supposedly implausible statement regarding why he
initially began following Warden. (R., pp. 64-68.)
First, contrary to Warden’s claims in his amended petition, Deputy AuGello was
remarkably consistent regarding where he first encountered Warden’s vehicle and where he
eventually stopped Warden, particularly in light of the number of times, over an extended period
of time, he was asked to testify on the topic. In Deputy AuGello’s probable cause affidavit, he
stated that he was headed eastbound on Highway 12 when he encountered Warden heading
westbound. (Ex. A, p. 2.) Deputy AuGello turned around to follow and “caught up to [Warden]
at about mile post 73.” (Id.) The affidavit lists the “Location of Occurrence” as “Hwy 12 at Mile
Post 72.” (Ex. A, p. 1.) Warden’s petition claims that the affidavit is internally inconsistent
because the mile markers “on Highway 12 get bigger in value as the highway tracks eastward,”
and so “the numbers would have decreased from mile marker 72, rather than increase as he went
westward.” (R., p. 64.) There is nothing remotely inconsistent. Deputy AuGello encountered
Warden’s vehicle while he was headed east and Warden was headed west on Highway 12; he
found a place to turn around and “caught up” to Warden’s vehicle around mile post 73, both
vehicles now headed west, with the mile post numbers decreasing; as he further explained in his
affidavit, he followed Warden for a distance and then, even after he turned on his lights and siren
to initiate a stop, Warden did not immediately pull over. Warden finds an inconsistency only by
insisting on reading “Location of Occurrence” in the affidavit as the location Deputy AuGello
initially encountered Warden, rather than the location the stop was eventually effectuated.
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This is perfectly consistent with Deputy AuGello’s later testimony during various
hearings. In the preliminary hearing in the underlying case, he testified that he encountered
Warden at “roughly milepost 73” while Warden was headed west and he was headed east, he
turned around and followed, eventually making a stop “in the area of 72 – milepost 72.” (Ex. B,
p. 8, L. 15 – p. 13, L. 3.) At the hearing in a separate civil case regarding the suspension of
Warden’s license, Deputy AuGello again stated that he first encountered Warden “[a]bout
milepost 73 on Highway 12” (Ex. C, p. 7, Ls. 9-13), and after he turned around to follow he
initiated a traffic stop after “approximately a mile”―or at about milepost 72―after observing the
vehicle fail to maintain its lane of traffic (Ex. C, p. 13, L. 23 – p. 16, L. 3). Warden suggests
that Deputy AuGello was later inconsistent at that hearing because defense counsel asked him,
“At mile marker 73, where this incident took place, is that around a corner or a bend or a curve of
some kind?” and Deputy AuGello did not affirmatively interject to state that the stop was
actually effectuated nearer to milepost 72. (R., p. 65.) But counsel asked a specific question
about the road near milepost 73; Deputy AuGello simply responded directly to that question; and
it was clear from the context that the “incident” was his initial encounter with Warden, not the
place where the stop eventually occurred. (Ex. C, p. 61, L. 13 – p. 62, L. 13 (asking about
Deputy AuGello’s ability to see Warden’s vehicle as he passed it).) It does not demonstrate or
suggest any inconsistency that he did not make some clarification. At the hearing on the motion
to suppress, he again stated that he initially encountered Warden about milepost 73 and stopped
him at about milepost 72. (Ex. E, p. 8, Ls. 2-9.) The closest Warden comes to any inconsistency
is in the preliminary hearing on the aggravate battery charge―a separate criminal case involving
Warden urinating on Deputy AuGello after he had already been arrested―where Deputy
AuGello stated that the arrest occurred at milepost 73. (Ex. D, p. 5, L. 18 – p. 6, L. 10.) While
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there is discussion there of Deputy AuGello referring to his report to refresh his recollection, he
apparently did not do so and, at a preliminary hearing concerned with the aggravated battery
charge, there was no further questioning regarding the details of the stop or the distinction
between where Deputy AuGello first encountered Warden and where he was eventually stopped.
(Id. 1) As the district court correctly found, the alleged inconsistencies are at best “[s]light
variations” regarding “immaterial details about an event that occurred eight months ago,” not
material and consequential misrepresentations. (Ex. F, p. 3; R., pp. 181-83.)
Warden’s attempt to cast doubt on Deputy AuGello’s stated reason for initially turning
around to follow him is likewise without merit. Deputy AuGello stated that he initially turned
around to follow Warden because, as Warden passed, he checked his driver’s side mirror and
observed Warden cross over the fog line.

(Ex. A, p. 2.) According to Warden’s back-of-the-

napkin calculations, given his estimated speed of the vehicles and the “drop or incline of the
road,” Deputy AuGello had only “3.5 seconds” to make such an observation. (R., pp. 95-96.)
Deputy AuGello testified that he checked his driver’s-side mirror and made the observation as
they were passing one another heading in opposite directions. (Ex. B, p. 10, L. 23 – p. 11, L. 12;
Ex. C, p. 11, L. 6 – p. 13, L. 22; p. 61, L. 13 – p. 62, L. 13.) Even crediting Warden’s
calculations, there is nothing implausible about the claim that he saw what he claims to have
seen.
But the more pressing problem for Warden’s amended petition is that even if he were
right that Deputy AuGello’s testimony on these points was not credible for some reason, there

1

Warden also points to testimony later at trial. (R., p. 66.) While there is nothing inconsistent in
that testimony either, it is not separately addressed here because Warden’s contention on appeal
is that his counsel was ineffective for failing to highlight alleged inconsistencies in a motion to
suppress. Testimony at trial is irrelevant to that argument.
10

would still be no basis for a motion to suppress. The testimony and statements with which
Warden takes issue concern where precisely Deputy AuGello first encountered Warden and why
Deputy AuGello turned around to follow Warden. But Deputy AuGello consistently stated that
he initiated a traffic stop well after he turned around and began following Warden, and only after
observing Warden repeatedly cross the double yellow line and the fog line. (Ex. A, p. 2; Ex. B.,
p. 11, L. 13 – p. 12, L. 21.) It was the latter observations that prompted Deputy AuGello to
initiate a traffic stop for failure to maintain a lane and that provided reasonable suspicion
sufficient for him to do so. (Ex. C, p. 13, L. 8 – p. 16, L. 3; Ex. D, p. 8, L. 16 – p. 9, L. 2.)
Warden has never argued, either below in the post-conviction proceedings or on appeal, that
those observations were not sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop.
See State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996) (weaving
within lane and crossing center line sufficient for investigatory detention); State v. Benefiel, 131
Idaho 226, 229, 953 P.2d 976, 979 (1998) (same).
As a result, and as the district court recognized, whatever impeachment his attorney might
have conducted with respect to Deputy AuGello was irrelevant to whether Deputy AuGello had
reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop, and would not have supported a motion to suppress.
“Factors that caused Augello to stop Warden included his drifting from side to side, crossing the
yellow line, and a slow reaction to move to the right when a car went by him. None of those
factors had anything to do with the location of the stop.” (R., pp. 182-83.) Likewise, the court
correctly concluded that, even if Deputy AuGello was mistaken about seeing Warden cross the
fog line just after they passed each other, Deputy AuGello subsequently observed conduct while
following Warden that justified the stop.

(R., p. 184.)

At best, then, his counsel in the

underlying case could have tried to cast doubt on Deputy AuGello’s general credibility in the
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hope that the court would conclude that it could not trust Deputy AuGello’s particular testimony
regarding what happened after he began following Warden.
The decision not to file a motion to suppress on such an incredibly thin basis comes
nowhere near ineffective assistance of counsel warranting reversal. As discussed above, Warden
has not cast any doubt on Deputy AuGello’s credibility, much less so much doubt that the district
court would have completely disregarded his other testimony regarding the basis for the stop and
would have granted a motion to suppress.

Notably, the judge in this post-conviction

proceeding―who determined that the impeachment of Deputy AuGello was irrelevant to
whether the stop was reasonable―was the same judge that would have heard any motion to
suppress in the underlying case, and was the same judge who denied a motion for a new trial
based in part on allegations that Deputy AuGello’s testimony was not credible. (Ex. F.) Because
Warden has not shown that his motion would have been granted if filed, he has not established
that his counsel was ineffective. Black v. State, 165 Idaho 100, 106, 439 P.3d 1272, 1278 (Ct.
App. 2019). Even if he had, he would “still [be] required to overcome the presumption that the
decision not to file the motion was within the wide range of permissible discretion and trial
strategy.” Id. Strategic decisions―including whether to file a motion that presents a close
question―“cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction relief unless the decision is shown to have
resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings
capable of objective review.” Id. (quoting Wurdemann v. State, 161 Idaho 713, 720-21, 390
P.3d 439, 446-47 (2017)). As the district court found, there is no evidence here that the decision
not to file such a motion was a result of inadequate preparation or ignorance of the relevant law.
(R., pp. 184-85.)
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Warden has failed to show that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief. He has not provided an adequate record, failing to provide a
copy of the motion to suppress that was in fact filed in the underlying case. While he claims that
Deputy AuGello made inconsistent and implausible statements, he has not substantiated that
allegation. The statements to which he points do not even concern the reason for the traffic stop,
and so would not provide any basis for a motion to suppress. A motion to suppress based on the
credibility issues he identifies in his amended petition would surely have been denied and, at a
bare minimum, the decision not to file such a motion was a reasonable strategic choice.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s judgment
dismissing Warden’s amended petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 4th day of February, 2021.

/s/ Andrew V. Wake
ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 4th day of February, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
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ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
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/s/ Andrew V. Wake
ANDREW V. WAKE
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